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COMMENTS
STATUTE*-The automobile guest statute' took from the guest the common law right of action against the owner

AUTOMOBILES-TORTs-GuEST

or operator of the automobile for injuries suffered by the guest due to the
ordinary negligence of the driver. The determination of "guest" status has been
and continues to be a major problem in construing such a statute. 2 This com-

ment undertakes to discuss the problem of whether an owner can be a guest
in his own automobile where he is a non-driving occupant. Few courts have
had occasion to pass on this question.8 The landmark case, Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 4 held that the owner was not a "guest" under the Connecticut
guest statute 5 and could therefore recover for ordinary negligence of the
driver. The Gledhill case has been followed by most courts which have considered the question. 6 The Restatement of Torts 7 concurs with Gledhill. A
contrary conclusion has been reached in only one jurisdiction. 8 The New Mex* Ford v. Etheridge, 377 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1962).
1. See Automobile Guest Laws Today, Report of the Automobile Insurance Committee-1960, 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (1960), for a brief analysis of each guest statute
in the United States.
2. Ibid.
3. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 312 (1959) ; Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1281, 1301 (1956).
4. 121 Conn. 102, 183 Atl. 379 (1936).
5. Conn. Acts 1927, ch. 308, § 1, repealed by Conn. Acts 1937, ch. 270.
6. Wilson v. Workman, 192 F.Supp. 852 (D.C. Del. 1961), construing Delaware
guest statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 6101 (1953); Leonard v. Helms, 170 F.Supp.
143 (W.D. Va. 1959), aff'd, 269 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1959), 2 W. & M. L. Rev. 520
(1959-60), construing Virginia guest statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950) ; Walton
v. Tull, 356 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1962), construing Arkansas guest statute, Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 75-913 (1957) ; Ahlgren v. Ahlgren, 152 Cal.App.2d 723, 313 P.2d 88 (4th Dist.
Ct.App. 1957), and Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal.App.2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (2nd Dist.
Ct.App. 1957), 4 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 652 (1957), construing California guest statute,
Cal. Vehicle Code § 17158 (subsequently amended in 1961-see § 17158, Supp. 1962);
Peterson v. Winn, 373 P.2d 925 (Idaho 1962), construing Idaho guest statute, Idaho
Code Ann. § 49-1401 (1957); Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App.Div.2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (Sup.Ct. 1959), aff'd, 171 N.E.2d 462 (1960), construing Ohio guest statute, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 4515.02 (Page 1954) ; Henline v. Wilson, 111 Ohio App. 515, 174
N.E.2d 122 (1960), construing Ohio guest statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4515.02 (Page
1954) ; Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952), construing Virginia guest
stattite, Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950) ; Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d
732 (1960), construing Virginia guest statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950).
7. Restatement, Torts § 490, comment a (1934).
8. Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958), Note, 32 So. Cal. L. Rev.
93 (1958-59), Note, 38 Texas L. Rev. 110 (1959-60), construing South Dakota guest
statute, S.D. Code § 44.0362 (1939). See Murray v. Lang, 252 Iowa 260, 106 N.W.2d
643 (1960) (owner's son held to be a "guest" within the meaning of the Iowa guest
statute, Iowa Code Ann. § 321.494 (1949)).
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ico Supreme Court, in construing its guest statute,9 has never passed on this

question.' 0
In excluding the owner from the scope of guest status under the Connecticut statute" the Gledhill court 12 relied on the dictionary definition of

and an analogy to an innkeeper, 14 and concluded that it was not the
expressed intent of the legislature to hold the owner to be a guest under the
"guest"

9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (1953):
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case

of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said
owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of
the rights of others.
10. "Guest" is not defined by the New Mexico guest statute, but the statute does
speak of "guest without payment." Ibid. Thus, non-payment by the passenger appears
to be the controlling element as to the determination of "guest" status. See Davis v.
Hartley, 69 N.M. 91, 364 P.2d 349 (1961), where the court held that an occupant who

requested the driver to make a certain trip and paid three dollars for gasoline en
route was a guest, not a fare-paying passenger. See also Note, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev.
279 (1959).
However, a prospective purchaser of a motor vehicle, i.e., a non-paying business
guest, does not have "guest" status. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-2 (1953).
11. Conn. Acts 1927, ch. 308, § 1, repealed by Conn. Acts 1937, ch. 270:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his

guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part
of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.
"The purpose of . . . [the guest statute] was to deny a recovery for negligence
against one transporting in his automobile a member of his family, a social guest, or a
casual invitee in an action brought by the recipient of his hospitality." Gledhill v.
Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 At. 379, 380 (1936), quoting from Bradley v.
Clarke, 118 Conn. 641, 174 At. 72, 73 (1934).
"It is plain that the person must be transported as a guest of the other party, and
the transportation must be without payment, in order for the provisions of the statute
to apply." 183 At. at 380. Compare with note 10 supra.
12. In the Gledhill case, Gledhill and Graham were riding in Gledhill's automobile.
They were going on a fishing trip. Graham was driving at Gledhill's request, and
Gledhill was sitting on the front seat at the time of the accident.
13. Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 At. 379, 380 (1936) : "'Guest'
is defined as . . . 'a visitor entertained without pay; hence, a person to whom the
hospitality of a home, club, etc., is extended.' As used in the statute the term imports
that the person riding in a motor vehicle is a recipient of the hospitality of the owner
or driver."
14. Ibid.: "In Walling v. Potter, 35 Conn. 183, 185 [(1868)], in considering whether
the relation of innkeeper and guest arose, we said that 'any one away from home, receiving accommodations at an inn as a traveler, is a guest,' and that 'a guest is one
who patronizes an inn as such.' "
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15

facts of the case. The Connecticut courts strictly construe statutes in derrogation of the common law,' 8 and the courts which have followed the reasoning
17
of Gledhill do likewise.
The only guest statute case wherein the owner was held to be a guest in his
automobile, Phelps v. Benson,l' represents a more sensible approach to the
problem. The Minnesota court, construing the South Dakota guest statute,' 9
rejected Gledhill's dictionary definition of "guest" and the innkeeper analogy
as being "too restrictive as applied to these motor vehicle guest statutes."' 20
Holding that an owner could be a guest in his automobile, 2' the controlling
15. Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., supra note 13, at 381: "There is nothing from
which the inference could be drawn that Gledhill was enjoying the hospitality of
Graham. The most that is indicated is that Graham was performing a gratuitous
service for Gledhill. Proof of this fact does not make Gledhill the guest of Graham. To
hold that if the owner of an automobile is riding therein and a friend is driving, the
owner is the guest of the friend simply because the friend is driving, would be to
import into the statute a meaning not expressed by the Legislature."
16. See Stoll v. Almon C. Judd Co., 106 Conn. 551, 138 At. 479 (1927).
On construction of the guest statute, the court in Gledhill said, 183 Atd. at
380: "[The guest statute] denies to a certain class of passengers in an automobile a right to recover compensation from the owner or driver for injuries
received by reason of the negligence of either in its operation, and the construction of the statutes 'should not be extended beyond the correction of the
evils and the attainment of the permissible social objects which, it may be
assumed, were the inducing reasons for its enactment.'"
17. See note 6 supra.
18. 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958). In the Phelps case, a pair of married
couples, the Bensons and the Higginses, went on a pleasure trip in the Higgins' automobile, the parties sharing expenses under a prearranged agreement. The accident
occurred while Mr. Benson was driving the automobile in South Dakota.
19. S.D. Code §44.0362 (1939) :
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his
guest without compensation for such transportation shall have cause of action
for damages against such owner or operator for injury death, or loss, in case
of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the willful and
wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle, and unless
such willful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death, or loss for
which the action is brought; and no person so transported shall have such
cause of action if he has willfully or by want or ordinary care brought the injury upon himself.
20. Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533, 541 (1958).
This rejection was based in part on the fact that South Dakota does not follow a
policy of strict construction of statutes in derrogation of the common law. See S.D.
Code § 65.0202(1) (1939) ; and Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
The other basis for such rejection was "the purposes for which the statute was
enacted as shown by Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581, 74 A.L.R. 1189
[(1931)], which interpretation was adopted by South Dakota when it enacted its
guest law. . . ." Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533, 541 (1958).
21. The court disposed of the issue of the status of the owner's wife by relying on
a South Dakota case, Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941), which
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question then became: Had there been sufficient compensation moving from
the owner to the operator to take the owner outside the scope of the guest
statute? 2 2 The court concluded there had not, holding that the mere sharing
of expenses of a pleasure trip is not such compensation as will remove guest
23
status from the owner.
In Ford v. Etheridge,2 4 decedent and defendent went on a fishing trip to a
lake in decedent's automobile, defendant driving. On the way to the lake, both
men drank several cans of beer; upon his arrival, decedent drank a half-pint of
whiskey and became violently ill. Hence, the two decided to return home,
defendant driving and decedent riding on the front seat. Defendant drove the
automobile off the highway, and decedent, received injuries from which he
died. Decedent's representative brought this wrongful death action, alleging
that the ordinary negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of her
husband's death. Defendant's answer raised, inter alia, the defense of the guest
statute.25 The trial court held both decedent and defendant negligent and the
held that a wife riding with her husband who owns the automobile, is his guest
within the meaning of the South Dakota guest statute.
The court's determination that the owner could be a guest proceeded on the
theory that neither couple went on the trip as a result of the invitation of the other,
that the trip was planned for the mutual benefit and pleasure of both couples, and
apparently that the host-guest relationship was a shifting one, i.e., whoever happened
to be driving at any particular time was the host and the others were the guests.
The court quoted from Eilts v. Bendt, 162 Neb. 538, 76 N.W.2d 623, 629 (1956),

in which case the Nebraska court defined a guest within the meaning of the Nebraska
guest statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-740 (1943), as follows: "A person riding in a motor
vehicle is a guest if his carriage confers only a benefit upon himself and no benefit upon
the owner or operator except such as incidental to hospitality, social relations, companionship, or the like, as a mere gratuity." Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d
533, 542 (1958).

22. 90 N.W.2d at 543.
23. Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W,2d 533, 543 (1958), quoting from Scotvoid v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266, 271 (1941):
'[W]e entertain the view that no basis exists for differentiating such a
guest from the true guest the Legislature had in mind unless the benefit he is to
bestow on the owner or operator is sufficiently real, tangible and substantial
to serve as the inducing cause of the transportation, and to operate to completely overshadow any considerations of mere hospitality growing out of
friendship or relationship.'
The court in Phelps did not consider an argument that the owner renders compensation to the operator by reason of furnishing his automobile and thereby contri-

buting to the cost of the transportation the equivalent of the value of the automobile. Such argument was a Pennsylvania court's basis for holding in an earlier case,
Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841 (1952), that the owner could not be a guest
in his automobile under the Virginia guest statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950).
24. 377 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1962).
25. Record, pp. 8-10, 19, 27, Ford v. Etheridge, 377 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1962).
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guest statute inapplicable. 2 On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Mexico,
held, Reversed and Remanded with instructions to set aside judgment for
defendant, determine plaintiff's damages and enter judgment accordingly.
Decedent, as a matter of law, had not been contributorily negligent.27 The
question of the applicability of the guest statute was neither raised, nor
questioned, on appeal.
The New Mexico guest statute is identical to the Connecticut statute, 2 and
the New Mexico Supreme Court has said it presumes the New Mexico legislature adopted the prior construction and interpretation of the Connecticut
statute by the highest court of Connecticut.29 The New Mexico courts have
followed a policy of strict construction of statutes in derrogation of the common law.8 0 The facts of Ford are similar to those of Gledhill.31 Although
2
Gledhill was decided after the enactment of the New Mexico guest statute,
the Connecticut authorities relied upon by the court in Gledhill were cases
decided prior to enactment. This fact, plus the policy of strict construction,
could furnish the New Mexico Supreme Court impetus to follow Gledhill.
Other considerations, however, suggest that decedent in Ford was a guest in
his automobile. The policy reasons commonly expressed by the courts for the
enactment of guest statutes are (1) the belief that it is unfair for a guest to
seek damages from one who has benefited or accommodated him, and (2) to
furnish an antidote to fraudulent claims against insurance companies conceived
by a collusive host and his guest.88 But the courts have not yet made the
26. Record, p. 136. The basis for such finding apparently was the assumption by the
trial judge that decedent could not have been a guest in his automobile, because one
of plaintiff's requested conclusions of law was "decedent was not a guest in his own
motor vehicle at any time pertinent hereto." Record, pp. 22-23.
The trial judge also found that decedent did not assume the risk. Ford v. Etheridge,
377 P.2d 386, 389 (N.M. 1962).
27. Id. at 389-90.
28. See notes 9 and 11 supra.
29. Smith v. Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 250, 242 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1952).
30. See Hinds v. Velasquez, 63 N.M. 282, 317 P.2d 899 (1957) ; El Paso Cattle Loan
Co. v. Hunt, 30 N.M. 157, 228 Pac. 888 (1924).
31. See note 12 supra.
32. The New Mexico guest statute was enacted in 1935, and Gledhill was decided
in 1936.
33. Napthali v. Lafazan, 8 App.Div.2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (Sup.Ct. 1959),
aff'd, 171 N.E.2d 462 (1960). See Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581,
584, (1931):

In many, probably most, of the cases between relatives or friends the real
defendant is an insurance company. Ordinary negligence is not hard to prove
if guest and host co-operate to that end. It is conceivable that such actions
are not always unattended by collusion, perjury, and consequent fraud upon
the court. While we may accept the contention that paid insurers are not objects

of special consideration by the Legislature, it is inadmissible for the court to
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determination of precisely who is to be protected by the guest statutes-the owner or the operator.
If an overriding policy reason for the guest statutes is the protection of insurance companies, then there is compelling reason for holding that the owner can
be a guest in his automobile if the owner's insurance company may be called
upon to pay for the operator's injurious driving. If the coverage of the insurance
policy extended only to the owner's injurious driving, then the owner should
not have guest status; in such a case the liability of the non-owning operator for
ordinary negligence would in no way prejudice the insurance company. This
is not the general situation, however, because most automobile liability insurance policies extend coverage to whoever is driving, under the so-called
"omnibus" clause.3 4 Therefore, the question of ownership, insofar as it denies
guest status, should become unimportant as far as the liability of the insurance
company is concerned once the tortious driving conduct of the operator has been
established.
A Texas court,as construing the Texas guest statute,3 6 which is similar to
the New Mexico guest statute, defined "guest" as one who receives hospitality
and gives no tangible benefit which serves as the inducing cause of his transconsider a law from the viewpoint that they are not entitled to a proper trial

and honest determination of liability in a lawsuit. Nor are insurance companies
alone interested in the question. The results of verdicts are mirrored in insurance rates, and the law provides a possible reason in the purse of the motor
owning public, most of whom carry liability insurance. It is not inconceivable that some passengers who solicit rides may manufacture claims for

liability. .

.

. The law also has social features. It is well known that drivers

hesitate to take neighbors for a ride or to assist on his way a weary traveler
because of potential liability for injuries.
34. The National Standard Policy contains the following provision: "Definition of
Insured. With respect to the insurance for bodily injury liability and for property
damage liability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured and also
includes any person while using the automobile and any person or organization
legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile is by
the named insured or with his permission." See Gregory & Kalven, Cases and

Materials on Torts 559 (1959).
It was formerly required in New Mexico under the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws, that the motor vehicle liability insurance policy "insure as insured the
person named therein and any other person using or responsible for the use of any
such motor vehicle with the consent ,express or implied of such named insured." N.M.
Laws 1947, ch. 201, § 17, repealed by N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 182, § 504.
Under present law no insurance policy may be issued in New Mexico until its
form has been approved by the superintendent of insurance. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-8-8.1
(1953). And it seems unlikely, in view of the National Standard Policy and the prior
New Mexico law, that the superintendent of the insurance would permit the issuance of
a motor vehicle liability policy without the inclusion of an omnibus clause.
35. McCarty v. Moss, 225 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949, error ref'd.).
36. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6701(b), (1960).
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portation.37 And it has been suggested that under such a definition the nondriving owner "can thus be thought of as a temporary guest of the driver,
between whom there has passed no tangible benefit other than a mutual exchange
of hospitality . .. . Such an interpretation could well be used in construing
the New Mexico guest statute. Yet even without this interpretation, the Texas
decision could be used in New Mexico as authority for giving the owner guest
status.
The decedent in Ford needed medical attention but was unable to drive his
automobile. Defendant was not under any legal obligation as to decedent's welfare. He voluntarily transported decedent in decedent's automobile solely for
decedent's benefit. There were other fishermen at the lake with whom defendant
could have ridden home. It was decedent, not defendant, who received hospitality and gave no tangible benefit which would serve as the inducing cause of his
transportation.
Although a conclusion that decedent had guest status would be contrary to
Section 490 of the Restatement of Torts, 9 this would not present a problem in
New Mexico. That section "deals only with the effect of the contributory
negligence of the carrier or host," 40 and in New Mexico the defense of contributory negligence is not available to the driver in an action brought by his
"guest" under the guest statute. 4 1
Had the problem been presented on cross-appeal by defendant, the supreme
court should have held that decedent was a guest in his automobile. The New
37. McCarty v. Moss, 225 S.W.2d. 883, 887 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949). "As used in the
statute the term 'guest' has its general and common understanding, and means that one
is a guest who is the recipient of the voluntary hospitality of the owner or operator
of the automobile." Ibid., quoting from Lind v. Nored, 133 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1939, error ref'd.).
38. Note, 38 Texas L. Rev. 110, 112 (1959-60).
39. Restatement, Torts § 490, comment a (1934)
Distinction between "passenger" and "guest." The phrase 'passenger in a
vehicle' is used to denote the fact that the plaintiff is one who is being carried
by another for hire. The word 'guest' is used to denote one whom the owner
or possessor of a motor car or other vehicle invites or permits to ride with him
as a gratuity, that is, without any financial return execpt such slight benefits
as it is customary to extend as part of the ordinary courtesies of the road.
(Emphasis added.)
This Section was used in Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d 732 (1960), to deny
the owner guest status under the Virginia guest statute, Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950).
40. Restatement, Torts § 490, comment c (1934).
41. "Contributory negligence will be denied as a defense where the act of negligence
of a defendant shows a reckless, wilful and wanton disregard of human life and the
consequences of his acts." Hall v. Stiles, 57 N.M. 281, 287, 258 P.2d 386, 390 (1953).
See also Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421, 130 P.2d 24 (1942), rehearing denied, 46 N.M.
492, 131 P.2d 981 (1942).
Assumption of risk is a proper defense under the guest statute. See State Highway
Comm'n v. Davis, 64 N.M. 399, 329 P.2d 422 (1958) ; Berkstresser v. Voight, 63 N.M.
470, 321 P.2d 1115 (1958).
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Mexico guest statute does not expressly exclude the owner from the scope of
guest status, and the supreme court has indicated that the owner may have
guest status.42 A policy reason for the guest statute-to discourage collusion
among parties to automobile accidents in order to collect insurance-and the
near universal presence of the "omnibus" clause in automobile liability insurance
policies weaken the argument for strict construction of the New Mexico guest
statute. 43 And the other policy reason-the belief it is unfair for a guest to
seek damages from one who has benefited or accommodated him-destroys the
argument for strict construction under the facts in Ford.
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has said it presumes that the New
Mexico legislature adopted Connecticut's interpretation of the Connecticut
guest statute, 44 the court did not follow Connecticut's interpretation of the
state of mind required to evidence a "heedless" or "reckless" disregard of the

rights of others under the guest statute. 45 This fact and the more modern interpretation of the guest statutes, as represented by the Phelps case, 46 would
47
have furnished the supreme court reason to refuse to follow the Gledhill case,

particularly in view of the absence of any "payment" moving from decedent to
defendant. Had the problem been presented on cross-appeal, and had the court
held that decedent was a guest, then the trial court's judgment for defendant
might well have been affirmed. 48

ROBERT M. SANDERFORD

42. Smith v. Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 249, 242 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1952): "The said
guest statute was enacted for the very purpose of preventing recovery by a guest of
damages resulting from the negligence of a driver and allows recovery only in case
the driver's acts were intentional or in heedless and reckless disregard of the rights
of others." (Emphasis added.)
43. The general rule of strict construction, i.e., statutes in derrogration of the common law should be strictly construed, is too general. The rule should be qualified to
read: Statutes in derrogation of the common law should be strictly construed only jhen
the policy reasons for the enactment of such statute so indicate.
44. Smith v. Meadows, 56 N.M. 242, 242 P.2d 1006 (1952).
45. In Amaro v. Moss, 65 N.M. 373, 376, 337 P.2d 948, 950-51 (1959), the supreme
court said: "The state of mind required to be shown under our guest statute is not
different from that required to secure a conviction for involuntary manslaughter where
a human is killed by an automobile."
Noting that this state of mind had never been required by the Connecticut courts
to evidence a heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others under the Connecticut guest statute, Justice Carmody said in his dissenting opinion: "The effect of
the instant decision goes a great deal further than we have ever gone before, and
considerably further than I believe we should. . . . The majority opinion is a substantial departure from our prior rulings [based on Connecticut decisions] ... " Id.
at 378, 337 P.2d at 952 (dissenting opinion).
46. Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d 533 (1958).
47. Gledhill v. Connecticut Co., 121 Conn. 102, 183 Atd. 379 (1936).
48. The reasons for affirmance are: (1) there is no evidence in the trial record
that defendant's conduct was intentional or wanton, (2) the supreme court did not
disturb the trial court's finding of no assumption of risk, and (3) contributory negligence is no defense to an action brought under the New Mexico guest statute. See
notes 26 and 41 supra.

